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What is the epistemic significance of discovering that one of your beliefs depends on an 
irrelevant causal factor?  
Suppose that you have a relatively high degree of belief in some proposition. 
Suppose that you then come to learn that your belief was (in part) caused by an irrelevant 
factor, a factor that does not bear on the truth of the proposition or on your possession of 
evidence for it.1 Should you lower your degree of belief in the proposition? 
One might think that the answer is clearly yes. If one of your beliefs is based on 
an irrelevant factor, it does not solely reflect the impact of evidence. And so, the thought 
goes, you ought not to believe it, or at least, you ought not to believe it as strongly. 
In “Lucky to be Rational,” Adam Elga defends a very different view.2 To the 
question of whether you should lower your degree of belief, Elga’s answer is: It depends. 
Each of us possesses standards of reasoning – beliefs about which forms of reasoning are 
good or bad. If what you discover is that the irrelevant factor caused you to fail to live up 
to your standards of reasoning, you should lower your degree of belief. If not, not.3 So 
long as you have been living up to your standards, you need not lower your degree of 
                                                 
1 This is a rough characterization of the appropriate notion of relevance. The appropriate notion is difficult 
to define precisely, though the distinction is clear in practice. 
2 Also see White (2010) for a careful and illuminating discussion of this issue. 
3 More generally, when you discover the existence of an irrelevant factor of one of your beliefs, how much 
you should lower your degree of confidence in the belief depends on the degree in which you are justified 
in believing that you failed to live up to your standards of reasoning. Moreover, if you justifiably but 
falsely believe that you failed to live up to your standards, you should also presumably lower your degree 
of belief. I’ll leave these modifications implicit in what follows. 
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belief. This is so even if you discover that your acceptance of the very standards in 
question is due to the irrelevant factor.4 
Elga recognizes a potential problem for his view – the discovery of an irrelevant 
causal factor can generate an ‘unsettling feeling’ in us, even in cases where we have been 
living up to our standards of reasoning. In defense of his view, he presents a diagnosis of 
this feeling. He argues that the discovery of an irrelevant factor makes salient a very 
general kind of skeptical worry. The force of this skeptical worry does not turn on the 
existence of an irrelevant factor. So, Elga claims, the presence of an unsettling feeling 
does not reflect any new rational pressure to lower one’s degree of belief. In this way, 
Elga hopes to explain away the counterintuitive nature of his view. 
Elga’s view is striking and his discussion is compelling. The purpose of this short 
paper is to argue that Elga’s main claims are mistaken. In what follows, I raise three 
related issues. My primary conclusion is that Elga overlooks an important connection 
between justification and explanation. Once this connection is appreciated, a serious 
problem with Elga’s view becomes apparent. In many cases, the discovery of an 
irrelevant factor should lead us to lower our degree of belief, even when we have been 
living up to our standards of reasoning. 
 
II The Significance of Elga’s View 
The first issue that I’d like to raise is not a criticism or objection. It concerns the 
significance of Elga’s view for familiar philosophical disputes.  
                                                 
4 Even on Elga’s view, you can have reason to give up some of your standards of reasoning when you 
discover the existence of an irrelevant causal factor. This can occur if you discover that your acceptance of 
some of your standards is in conflict with other (perhaps more fundamental) standards. 
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Elga’s discussion is primarily focused on (more-or-less) everyday cases of 
reasoning. It’s worth noting that his claims also have significant ramifications for 
important philosophical debates. 
Consider the philosophy of mathematics and in particular, the debate over 
mathematical Platonism. One influential argument against Platonism is the so-called 
Benacerraf-Field argument.5 Very roughly, the argument goes something like this: If 
mathematical Platonism is true, there is no way to explain how it is that we are reliable 
about mathematics. In particular, given that mathematical entities are acausal, aspatio-
temporal, and mind- and language-independent, there is no explanation of how it is that 
we by-and-large believe mathematical truths and disbelieve mathematical falsehoods. 
According to Platonism, then, our mathematical practices are due to irrelevant factors. 
Our reliability about mathematics is purely a matter of luck. This conclusion – it is 
claimed – poses a significant problem for Platonism. 
Related arguments are familiar from discussions of the nature of morality. 
According to one version of Mackie’s queerness argument, moral realism faces difficulty 
in accounting for our reliability about moral truths, since if objective values exist, they 
are peculiar entities outside of our ken.6 Similarly, Street argues that given that our 
evaluative faculties are the product of evolution, moral realism cannot explain how our 
moral beliefs match the objective moral truths.7 Each of these arguments attempts to 
show that according to moral realism, our reliability about morality is purely an accident. 
This conclusion is then claimed to pose a significant problem for moral realism. 
                                                 
5 See the introduction and title essay of Field (1989). See Benacerraf (1973) for an important precursor. See 
Schechter (2010) for a discussion of how best to understand the argument. 
6 See Mackie (1977). Mackie’s argument is often interpreted as depending purely on metaphysical 
considerations. But in his discussion, he emphasizes that the argument concerns our moral knowledge. 
7 See Street (2006). 
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Epistemological arguments such as these provide some of the most influential 
considerations against realist and objectivist views of mathematics, morality, modality, 
and other domains.8 
What is worth noting is that if Elga is right, none of these arguments is any good. 
Consider the Benacerraf-Field argument. On Elga’s view, so long as our mathematical 
practices conform to our standards of reasoning, any commitment to the view that it was 
a matter of luck that our mathematical practices are reliable should not be worrying. The 
Platonist can quite happily accept that her reliability is purely a matter of luck. She need 
not reduce her degree of confidence in her belief that she is reliable, in Platonism, or in 
her first-order mathematical views. On Elga’s view, then, the Benacerraf-Field argument 
has no force. And an analogous result applies to the cases of morality, modality, and 
other domains. On Elga’s view, such epistemological arguments can simply be dismissed. 
This is not (yet) an objection to Elga’s view. It is, however, a significant 
ramification. It is also a reason for caution. Many find the Benacerraf-Field argument and 
related arguments intuitively compelling. We would need very good reason to dismiss all 
such arguments as worthless. 
 
III Living Up to Your Standards 
The second issue that I’d like to raise concerns Elga’s claim that upon discovering the 
existence of an irrelevant causal factor, so long as your reasoning did not violate your 
standards of reasoning, you need not lower your degree of belief. 
                                                 
8 See Peacocke (1999) for a discussion of the general ‘Integration Challenge’ of reconciling the 
metaphysics and epistemology of a domain. In that work, Peacocke presents versions of this challenge for 
many domains, including our knowledge of the past, our knowledge of modality, and self-knowledge. 
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In defending this claim, Elga contrasts two kinds of cases where one of your 
beliefs depends on an irrelevant factor. First, there are cases in which the irrelevant factor 
led you to violate your standards of reasoning in forming the belief. Second, there are 
cases in which the irrelevant factor led you to change your standards of reasoning. The 
formation of the belief did not violate your standards of reasoning. Instead, the irrelevant 
factor led you to adopt the very standards in question. 
If I discover that I’m in the first kind of case, Elga says, I should lower my degree 
of belief. This is because what I’ve discovered is a violation of my standards of 
reasoning. I should go back and fix my mistake.9 If I discover that I’m in the second kind 
of case, however, I need not lower my degree of belief. I have not discovered any mistake 
that I’ve made in my reasoning. 
There is a third kind of case worth considering. In the third kind of case, (i) my 
belief depends on an irrelevant causal factor, (ii) my reasoning was fully in accord with 
my standards, but (iii) my standards require that when I discover the existence of the 
irrelevant factor, I reduce my degree of belief. In other words, my standards treat the 
discovery of the influence as new information about the world or about myself. This new 
information is treated as relevant to my degree of belief. In such a case, I was not 
violating my standards in reasoning as I did earlier. But I would be violating my 
standards in not now modifying my degree of belief.10 
                                                 
9 Elga ought to slightly amend his view here. Presumably, it is not the discovery that a thinker failed to live 
up to his standards that is of central importance. Rather, it’s the fact that he violated his standards; the 
thinker should have had a lower degree of belief to begin with. Granted, when someone comes to find out 
that he has reasoned in a problematic way, he should update his degree of belief. And even if a thinker has 
a justified but false belief that he’s violated his standards, he should lower his degree of belief. But these 
phenomena are both due to the more fundamental normative fact that thinkers should not violate their 
standards. 
10 For completeness, it is worth mentioning a fourth kind of case. In such a case, (i) my belief depends on 
an irrelevant causal factor, (ii) my reasoning violated my standards, but (iii) my standards allow me not to 
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So far, this is just to describe a formal possibility. Certainly, there could be 
standards of reasoning that are like this. But, presumably, Elga will claim that our 
standards are not like this and, moreover, that standards like this are not good standards 
to adopt. If this is what Elga would like to say, I’d like to hear more about why such 
standards are no good. It is not at all obvious that such standards are problematic.  
But I don’t merely want to claim that this third kind of case is a formal possibility. 
I also want to claim that there is reason to think that some of our actual standards of 
reasoning fall in this class. 
To support this claim, let me make a very general claim about theory choice: 
Certain phenomena are striking in that they seem to “call out” for explanation. At least 
ceteris paribus, a theory that provides an explanation of a striking phenomenon is better 
than one that treats it as merely accidental. It is a cost of a theory if it treats striking 
phenomena (within the domain of the theory) as accidental or otherwise unexplained. 
This is a claim about some of our most general standards of explanatory 
reasoning. Presumably, this claim needs to be tightened in several ways, but it is 
extremely plausible that something in the ballpark is true. 
It is difficult, of course, to provide a general account of strikingness.11 But we are 
adept at identifying striking phenomena. One striking phenomenon is that our reasoning 
is generally pretty good – that is, we are more-or-less reliable about very many domains. 
Indeed, for each of these many domains, it is striking that we are reliable about it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
reduce my degree of belief when I discover the existence of the irrelevant factor. Such standards do not 
care how you got to your current set of beliefs. Versions of Harman’s “general conservatism” might have 
this structure. See Harman (1995), page 27. 
11 See Horwich (1982) and Schlesinger (1991) for attempts. I take it that two most promising suggestions 
are the following: (i) A phenomenon is striking if it can be described using a simple rule; (ii) A 
phenomenon is striking if there is a salient theory that would predict or explain it. These two proposals may 
be related. If a phenomenon can be described by a simple rule, there may be a salient explanation of how it 
arose – namely, some agent may have intentionally caused the rule to be instantiated. 
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Suppose, then, that we discover that our reasoning about a domain reflects the influence 
of an irrelevant factor. In particular, suppose we discover that our reliability about the 
domain is (at best) accidental. Given my claim about theory choice, this information 
generates a tension within our overall view. It generates pressure to alleviate the tension 
by doing at least one of the following three things: (i) giving up on the claim that our 
reliability is accidental; (ii) giving up on the claim that our reliability is striking; or (iii) 
giving up on the claim that we are, indeed, reliable. In many cases, there will be some 
pressure to do all three. In particular, there will be some pressure to lower our degree of 
belief in our reliability about the domain.12 Correlatively, there will be pressure to lower 
our degree of confidence in our first-order beliefs. 
Why do I say that there is pressure to lower our degree of belief in our reliability 
in many cases? Why not say this about all cases? The motivation for the hedge stems 
from a rather puzzling line of thought. There is some reason to think that we cannot 
rationally have less than full confidence in our most fundamental rules of reasoning. The 
line of thought is as follows: We could only rationally have less than full confidence in 
our fundamental rules if our fundamental rules recommended that we not fully trust them 
(given the appropriate inputs). After all, it is our rules that tell us what degrees of belief 
to have. But it would be impossible to follow rules that tell us not to fully trust 
themselves. At the very least, it would be impossible to follow such rules rationally. On 
pain of irrationality, then, we must be fully confident in our most fundamental rules.13  
                                                 
12 What I just have done, in effect, is to state a general form of the Benacerraf-Field argument. 
13 See Lewis (1971), Field (2000), and Elga (2010) for versions of this argument. In more recent work, 
Field has rejected the argument. 
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I do not want to endorse this line of thought – it leads to some extremely 
counterintuitive conclusions.14 For example, it suggests that we cannot rationally debate 
the correctness of our fundamental deductive and ampliative rules, and that seems wrong. 
Yet, the argument is difficult to reject. So I’d like to stay neutral here on the question of 
whether we can rationally have less than full confidence in our most fundamental rules of 
reasoning. If we cannot, then there are cases in which we cannot rationally doubt our 
reliability, even when we discover that our reliability is at best accidental.15 Any tension 
generated by the discovery of an irrelevant factor can only be alleviated by reducing our 
confidence in the claim that our reliability is accidental or in the claim that our reliability 
is striking. (Or it may simply be swallowed.)  
This hedge aside, the main point is simply this: There are general considerations 
having to do with the nature of explanation and theory choice that suggest that we accept 
very general standards of reasoning that fit what I called the third kind of case. Our 
standards at least sometimes treat the discovery of an irrelevant causal factor of a belief 
as new information that tells against the belief in question. Discovering the existence of 
an irrelevant causal factor can serve to undermine a belief, even when our earlier 
reasoning was in accord with our standards of reasoning. And even when such a 
discovery does not serve to undermine the belief in question, it still can have a significant 
epistemic effect on our overall package of beliefs. 
                                                 
14 See Schechter (forthcoming) for a brief discussion of some of them. 
15 Nagel (1997) argues on other grounds that basic logic and mathematics is immune from doubt. If he’s 
right, this would present another motivation for thinking that in certain cases, we cannot rationally reduce 
belief in our reliability.  
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IV The Diagnosis 
The third and final issue that I’d like to raise concerns Elga’s diagnosis of the unsettling 
feeling we get when we discover the existence of irrelevant causal factors even though 
we’ve been living up to our own standards of reasoning.  
Elga’s diagnosis is that when we discover the existence of an irrelevant influence, 
this makes salient the existence of multiple coherent standards of reasoning that are 
incompatible with our own. Given that we have no independent grounds for our 
standards, in line with a familiar kind of skeptical argument, we’re tempted to conclude 
that we have no grounds at all for thinking that our standards are correct. On Elga’s view, 
then, discovering that some of our standards depend on an irrelevant causal factor does 
not generate any new pressure to give up the standards. It merely makes salient a familiar 
sort of skeptical worry. 
There is reason to be wary of this diagnosis. 
Consider the following sort of case: Suppose I believe that there are very many 
sets of standards concerning some domain that are internally coherent. Exactly one of 
these sets is correct and the others are not. Suppose I further believe that God implanted 
in me the standards I accept. Now contrast two ways of filling out the story. In the first, I 
believe that God implanted me with the correct standards for some reason – say, he’s 
epistemologically benevolent. In the second, I instead believe that God flipped a coin 
many times to determine which of the many internally coherent standards to implant.16 
I maintain that it would be a lot less unsettling to be in the first scenario than to be 
in the second. This is so despite the fact that in both scenarios, I am aware that there are 
                                                 
16 Here is a second pair of contrasting cases: Suppose that I believe that evolution implanted in me the 
standards that I accept. In the first case, I believe that there was selection pressure to have the correct 
standards. In the second case, I believe that there was no such pressure. 
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multiple coherent standards of belief. Moreover, in neither scenario do I to possess any 
independent reason to believe my standards are correct. Elga’s diagnosis cannot explain 
this difference in my attitudes.17 
What is the explanation of the difference in my attitudes? I suggest that it does not 
primarily have to do with considerations of independence. Rather, it has to do with 
considerations of explanation. In the first scenario, I possess an explanation of why I 
have the correct standards. This may be an explanation only by my lights – it may fail to 
be dialectically effective against an agnostic or skeptic. But it is reassuring nonetheless. 
In the second scenario, I lack any such explanation. 
The moral, I suggest, is that part of what’s unsettling about discovering an 
irrelevant influence is that it leads us to recognize that we lack an explanation of why it is 
that we’ve gotten it right. Moreover, the irrelevant influence suggests there is no 
explanation to be had. This is profoundly discomforting. 
Notice that this source of discomfort is not closely related to skepticism. The 
pressure is not to refute a skeptic or to find some fully independent reason to accept one 
of our fundamental beliefs. Rather, the pressure is the much more mundane pressure to 
possess explanations of striking phenomena that are good by our own lights. 
 
V Conclusion 
Let’s take stock. Suppose a thinker discovers that her standards of reasoning about some 
domain are due to some irrelevant factor. This raises the worry that there is no 
                                                 
17 Elga’s diagnosis also cannot explain why we feel unsettled even in cases where we find it difficult to 
imagine that there are any alternative coherent systems. Consider, for instance, the reaction of someone 
who discovers that his logical or mathematical practices are solely due to irrelevant factors. Such a thinker 
will feel unsettled even if he finds alternative systems unimaginable. 
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explanation of why it is that the relevant standards of reasoning are reliable. It generates 
pressure to reduce her degree of belief in her reliability. In ordinary cases – where it 
would not be irrational for the thinker to have less than full confidence in her reliability – 
she should, in fact, reduce her degree of belief. Correlatively, she should reduce her 
degree of confidence in her first-order beliefs about the domain. 
This view fits well with general considerations concerning explanation and theory 
choice. It also explains our attitude towards the discovery of irrelevant factors – and in 
particular, the “unsettled feelings” that they provoke. I conclude that in many cases, when 
we discover an irrelevant causal factor of a belief, we should lower our degree of 
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